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THE SEARCH FOR A SENSIBLE SEXTING SOLUTION:  
A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
Eric S. Latzer∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2009, a federal district judge sitting in Pennsylvania ef-
fectively quashed a local prosecutor’s efforts to punish teens for an 
increasingly widespread phenomenon called sexting.
1
  The case, Mil-
ler v. Skumanick,
2
 garnered nationwide attention and sparked a flurry 
of sexting media coverage.
3
  Sexting occurs when someone sends via 
text message or posts on the internet sexually charged messages or 
images, including nude or semi-nude pictures.
4
  Although not limited 
to younger people, a growing number of teenagers continue to en-
gage in sexting
5
 and consequently, the issue has become a source of 
widespread discussion among parents, lawmakers, and society gener-
ally.  Fundamentally, teenage sexting is a product of sexual curiosity, 
poor judgment, and a modern trend in which teenagers utilize elec-
tronic file sharing as their primary method of communication.
6
 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, 
2008, The College of New Jersey.  I would like to thank my mom, dad, and brother 
for their invaluable love, support, and assistance.  I would also like to thank Professor 
Kip Cornwell and Andrew Darcy for all of their input. 
 1 See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub 
nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See, e.g., Editorial, Protect Kids from Dangers of Sexting, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 3, 
2010, at D5, available at 2010 WLNR 134747.   
 4 Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 637.  
Typically, the subject takes a picture of him- or herself with a digital 
camera or cell phone camera, or asks someone else to take that pic-
ture.  That picture is stored as a digitized image and then sent via text-
message or the photo-send function on a cell phone, transmitted by 
computer through electronic mail, or posted to an internet website like 
Facebook or Myspace. 
Id. 
 5 See infra Part II.A.  
 6 See Riva Richmond, Sexting May Place Teens at Legal Risk, GADGETWISE, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 26, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/ 
sexting-may-place-teens-at-legal-risk/.  
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Perhaps most importantly in the context of sexting, 
“[t]echnology and mores are changing so rapidly that they have out-
stripped the ability of . . . the law, parents, and prosecutors to keep 
up.”
7
  And in what has become a disturbing trend, prosecutors 
around the country have chosen to criminalize these teenage indi-
scretions by employing harsh child pornography laws, including some 
that require teenage offenders to register as sex offenders under Me-
gan’s Law.
8
  When lawmakers adopted child pornography laws, they 
were designed to prevent adult abuses of minors; in sexting prosecu-
tions, though, prosecutors often attempt to punish “the very victims 
these laws were designed to protect.”
9
  In fact, prosecutors routinely 
target minors who create or distribute sexually explicit photographs, 
including pictures that depict the offenders themselves.
10
  Often, 
these prosecutors are concerned that the explicit photographs will 
circulate beyond the intended recipients and that a child porno-
grapher will ultimately come into their possession.
11
 
In the wake of Miller and several other well-publicized prosecu-
tions,
12
 a debate has occurred regarding the appropriate societal and 
legal response to teenage sexting.  Presently, potential criminal pe-
nalties for sexting vary widely, both in terms of their severity and the 
circumstances to which they are or are not applicable.  In a most ex-
treme scenario, under current federal sentencing guidelines, a six-
teen-year-old girl could receive life in prison as punishment for elec-
tronically sending sexually explicit pictures to a boy her age.
13
  Non-
criminal ramifications for sexting may also occur,
14
 including in-
stances of in-school bullying, which often necessitate a societal re-
sponse that is beyond the purview of criminal laws. 
 
 7 Editorial, Sexting and the Single Girl, 195 N.J.L.J. 934, 950 (2009).  
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 12 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 13 Richmond, supra note 6.  According to Mark Rasch, a former cybercrime pros-
ecutor, if the girl was eventually released, she might have to register as a sex offend-
er.  Id.  Rasch said, “The combination of poorly drafted laws, new technologies, dra-
conian and inflexible punishments, and teenage hormones make for potentially 
disastrous results.”  Id. 
 14 See, e.g., Dick Russ, Ohio to Address ‘Sexting’ Laws, WKYC (Apr. 14, 2009, 7:22 
AM), http://www.wkyc.com/print.aspx?storyid=111478 (detailing an Ohio story, in 
which an eighteen-year-old from Cincinnati committed suicide after she sexted a 
naked picture of herself which was subsequently forwarded to nearly every one of her 
high school classmates).   
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This Comment will explore the numerous manifestations
15
 of 
teenage sexting
16
 with a broad focus on consensual and nonconsen-
sual sexting.  Consensual sexting includes situations in which two or 
more juveniles transmit photos of one or both people to each other, 
and each juvenile participates knowingly and willfully.
17
  Alternatively, 
nonconsensual sexting essentially entails situations in which the pic-
tures or messages are sent or displayed without the consent of the 
subject.
18
  The Comment will ultimately urge lawmakers to pass antic-
ipatory laws that directly address both consensual and nonconsensual 
sexting.  Such legislative action will curtail current prosecutorial ap-
plication of child pornography statutes to sexting. 
Part II will broadly detail sexting with a focus on statistics and 
notable judicial responses to sexting in which courts have assessed 
novel prosecutorial applications of mostly antiquated child porno-
graphy laws.  Part II will also include perspectives on the proper so-
cietal response to sexting, including two competing—albeit broad—
scholarly approaches.  Part III will detail recent state responses to 
sexting, including proposed and passed legislation.  The author will 
highlight the potential effects of such laws, while additionally noting 
that most state legislatures have thus far remained silent about sext-
ing.  Even among states that have addressed sexting, responses have 
typically ignored the controversial realm of nonconsensual sexting. 
Finally, Part IV proposes a legislative response.  Specifically, it 
will argue that, once equipped with a proper understanding of the 
many manifestations of sexting, lawmakers should decriminalize cer-
tain types and provide for a more sensible response to others.  More 
generally, this Comment’s proposed solutions will allow legislatures 
to pass laws that are consistent with the legislative purpose behind 
child pornography laws and in accord with public policy goals.  The 
proposed laws will further seek to limit prosecutorial discretion and 
 
 15 The author recognizes that it is nearly impossible to anticipate all of the cir-
cumstances in which sexting may evolve.  With this in mind, this Comment will 
strongly emphasize two overarching manifestations of sexting: consensual and non-
consensual.  
 16 Unless otherwise noted, this Comment will focus on sexting that involves teens, 
including eighteen and nineteen- year-olds, who are legally considered adults, but 
nonetheless relevant in analyzing teenage sexting.    
 17 The concept extends to when a teen knowingly posts photos of himself or her-
self on the internet.   
 18 Nonconsensual sexting has also been referred to as “malicious” sexting.  See 
Peggy O’Crowley, The Sexting Generation, INSIDE JERSEY (Sept. 21, 2009, 3:34 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/insidejersey/index.ssf/2009/08/the_sexting_generation.html.   
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eliminate disproportional penalties, including sex-offender registra-
tion, for teenage sexting offenders. 
II. SCRUTINIZING SEXTING: FROM STATISTICS TO JUDICIAL AND 
SCHOLARLY RESPONSES 
A. The Statistics Behind Sexting 
Although fairly limited, research indicates that a substantial 
number of teenagers engage in sexting.
19
  The primary source for sta-
tistics on sexting is a 2008 survey conducted by the National Cam-
paign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy and Cosmo-
girl.com (“the survey”).
20
  Between September 25, 2008, and October 
3, 2008, the survey makers polled approximately 1,280 teens and 
young adults.
21
  For purposes of this Comment, the pertinent statistics 
focus on 653 of these participants who were teenagers between the 
ages of thirteen and nineteen.
22
  Among the 653 teens, 75% said they 
knew that sending sexually suggestive content, whether messages or 
images, would have “serious negative consequences.”
23
  Still, despite 
their awareness of these potential ramifications, 20% of the teens said 
that they had electronically sent or posted on the internet nude or 
 
 19 See THE NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY & 
COSMOGIRL.COM, SEX AND TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 
1 (2008), available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech 
_Summary.pdf [hereinafter CAMPAIGN].  According to its creators, the survey was the 
first public one of its kind to assess the number of teens who engage in sexting.  Id. at 
5.  
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 5. 
 22 Under applicable statutes, pictures of teens ages eighteen and nineteen do not 
amount to child pornography.  See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312(d)(1) (2010) 
(“Any person who intentionally views or knowingly possesses or controls any book, 
magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, computer depiction or oth-
er material depicting a child under the age of 18 years engaging in a prohibited sexual 
act or in the stimulation of such commits an offense.” (emphasis added)).  But if an 
eighteen or nineteen-year-old forwards such pictures to a minor, the eighteen or ni-
neteen-year-old may be prosecuted for disseminating such material to a minor.  See, 
e.g., State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009) (upholding the conviction of 
defendant for knowingly disseminating obscene material to a minor under Iowa 
Code § 728.2 (2005)).  With this in mind, an important statistic from the National 
Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy and Cosmogirl.com research 
is that among the 653 teens, eleven percent were young teen girls, between thirteen 
and sixteen, who said they had engaged in sexting.  CAMPAIGN, supra note 19, at 1 
(emphasis added).   
 23 CAMPAIGN, supra note 19, at 3.  The survey-makers do not define “serious nega-
tive consequences.”  Id. 
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semi-nude pictures or videos of themselves.
24
  This nonchalance is al-
so evidenced in mainstream media explorations of sexting.
25
 
The statistics garnered from the survey are widely cited by main-
stream media sources.
26
  Although one researcher has questioned the 
survey’s veracity,
27
 other polls also indicate that sexting is pervading 
teenage culture.  As an example, the Hearst Corporation has con-
ducted a poll in which 20% of teens admitted that they have sent sex-
ually explicit photos of themselves through text messages.
28
  In addi-
tion, wiredsafety.org, a non-profit organization dedicated to internet 
safety, conducted research that indicates that 44% of teen boys said 
they have seen at least one naked picture of a female classmate.
29
  Not 
surprisingly, statistics also indicate that sexting is not limited to tee-
nagers in this country.
30
  As the foregoing research indicates, sexting 
appears to be a pervasive phenomenon in teen culture. 
 
 24 Id. at 1.  
 25 See O’Crowley, supra note 18.  O’Crowley describes an otherwise typical North 
Jersey teen who posts nude pictures of herself on Facebook despite knowing that it is 
“inappropriate” and that she “can get into deep trouble and cause embarrassment 
for herself and her family.”  Id.  The author additionally cites a survey conducted by 
Susan Lipkins, a New York psychologist who works with children and adolescents.  Id.  
Lipkins said that about half of her survey recipients “posted suggestive or erotic im-
ages even though they already realized the material could get them in trouble at 
school or work.  Most also [said] they were aware it could cause them potential per-
sonal and family embarrassment.” Id.     
 26 See, e.g., Donna Leinwand, Survey: 1 in 5 Teens Sext Despite Risks, U.S.A. TODAY, 
June 25, 2009, at A3; Rachel Simmons, The Sext Generation, HUFFINGTON POST (June 
18, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachel-simmons/the-sext-generation_ 
b_217715.html. 
 27 See PETER E. CUMMING, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, VOICES, TECHNOLOGY, SEXUALITY 1, 6 
(May 26, 2009), available at http://www.arts.yorku.ca/huma/cummingp/documents 
/TeenSextingbyPeterCummingMay262009.pdf.  Cumming, criticizing the survey, has 
said that it was conducted exclusively online, the survey makers “no doubt have 
vested interests in the results,” and that “the very broad category of ‘nude or semi-
nude’ photos used in the survey questions recognizes no distinctions between nudity, 
sexuality, and pornography.”  Id. at 6.  
 28 Parental Controls Help Guard Against Sexting, WISN.COM (July 28, 2009), 
http://www.wisn.com/news/20207767/detail.html.    
 29 Alexandra Marks, Charges Against ‘Sexting’ Teens Highlight Legal Gaps, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 31, 2009, at 25. 
 30 In the UK, for example, Beatbullying, a British charity devoted to preventing 
bullying in school settings, conducted its own sexting research.  See generally 
BEATBULLYING, http://www.beatbullying.org/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).  Survey re-
cipients included 2,000 teenagers, ages eleven to eighteen-years old.  Truth of Sexting 
Amongst UK Teens, BEATBULLYING (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.beatbullying.org/dox/ 
media-centre/news-archive/August%2009/truth_of_sexting.html.  Of the teens sur-
veyed, 38% stated they had received a sexually explicit or distressing text or email.  
Id.  Out of the 38% that received messages, 70% of the teens said they knew the 
sender of the message, 45% of the sexually explicit messages were from a peer, and 
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B. Beyond Statistics: How to Combat Sexting 
Against this statistical backdrop, it is important to realize that 
sexting manifests itself in a variety of circumstances.  To fully under-
stand the debate surrounding both the appropriate societal response 
to sexting and the impact of several judicial rulings, one must be 
cognizant of two overarching sexting manifestations: consensual sext-
ing and nonconsensual sexting.
31
  As this Comment will illustrate, 
most societal discussion and legislative responses
32
 focus on consen-
sual sexting. 
1. Prosecutorial and Judicial Responses to Sexting 
Many prosecutors nationwide have attempted to curb teenage 
sexting.
33
  In doing so, the prosecutors have utilized antiquated child 
pornography statutes by charging children under the same statutes 
originally designed to protect them.
34
  In Miller—which has become 
one of the most recognized sexting cases—a local prosecutor in 
Pennsylvania sought to compel several teenagers involved in a sexting 
incident at a local school to complete a program focused on educa-
tion and counseling.
35
  The district attorney, George Skumanick, told 
the parents of the sexting teens that any teen who refused to com-
plete the program would be charged under the state’s child porno-
graphy laws and forced to register as a sex offender.
36
  Skumanick’s 
primary targets were the girls who had taken and were depicted in 
the pictures.
37
  The pictures in question included one in which two 
girls were shown in suggestive poses and another that showed one of 
 
23% were from a current boyfriend or girlfriend.  Id.  One should note that this sur-
vey broadly states that the content distributed between and among teens was “sexual-
ly explicit or distressing.”  Id.  Unlike the previous survey conducted by the National 
Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy and Cosmogirl.com, which 
differentiated between sexually suggestive messages and messages containing nude 
or semi-nude photos, this survey does not undertake such a specific inquiry.  Accor-
dingly, for purposes of analyzing the potential criminality of sexting participants, this 
survey is not as instructive. 
 31 See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra Part III. 
 33 See, e.g., Richmond, supra note 6 (highlighting sexting prosecutions in Pennsyl-
vania, Ohio, and Wisconsin). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub 
nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).  The program was created to 
teach the girls to “gain an understanding of how their actions were wrong[,] . . . gain 
an understanding of what it means to be a girl in today’s society, both advantages and 
disadvantages, and . . . identify nontraditional societal and job roles.”  Id. 
 36 Id. at 639. 
 37 Id. 
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the girls with a towel wrapped around her body just below her 
breasts.
38
  The children’s parents ultimately brought suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged that Skumanick’s take-it-or-leave-it counsel-
ing offer constituted a violation of the children’s rights under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
39
  The plaintiffs filed a motion for 
a temporary restraining order against Skumanick to preclude him 
from filing criminal charges against the girls.
40
  In ruling for the 
plaintiffs, the court took the “extraordinary” step of granting the 
temporary restraining order against Skumanick.
41
 
Following the court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order, 
Skumanick said that he would appeal the order but only pursue 
charges against Nancy Doe,
42
 the girl pictured with a towel below her 
breasts.
43
  On appeal, despite Skumanick’s concession, the Third Cir-
cuit affirmed the issuance of the temporary restraining order as ap-
plied to Nancy Doe.
44
  It noted that although prosecutors routinely 
and permissibly present defendants with pre-indictment offers of le-
niency, Skumanick’s take-it-or-leave-it counseling offer was “likely re-
taliatory, rather than a good faith effort to enforce the law, [as 
shown] by the lack of evidence of probable cause” against Nancy 
Doe.
45
  Specifically, the court noted that even assuming the state’s 
child pornography laws applied to the photo in question—an issue 
upon which the court expressly did not rule—Skumanick failed to 
present any evidence that Doe ever possessed or distributed the pho-
to, two alternative requirements under the statute.
46
  In fact, at oral 
argument, the district attorney’s office only pointed to evidence of 
the existence of the photograph itself and the fact that it had ap-
peared on classmates’ cell phones.
47
  As the court noted, 
“[A]ppearing in a photograph provides no evidence as to whether 
 
 38 Id.  The suggestive picture showed two girls “from the waist up, each wearing a 
white opaque towel.”   Id. 
 39 Id. at 640.  
 40 Id. 
 41 Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 641 (citing Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 375 (2008) (calling an injunction an “‘extraordinary remedy’ 
that is never awarded as of right”)).  
 42 The district court in Miller allowed the girl, Nancy, and her mother, Jane, to 
proceed under pseudonyms.  Id. at 639 n.2.   
 43 Dionne Searcey, A Lawyer, Some Teens and a Fight Over ‘Sexting,’ WALL ST. J., Apr. 
21, 2009, at A17. 
 44 Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 45 Id. at 153. 
 46 Id. at 153–54. 
 47 Id. at 154. 
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that person possessed or transmitted the photo.”
48
  Accordingly, the 
court affirmed the lower’s court’s issuance of a temporary restraining 
order.
49
  It noted, however, that the district attorney could later move 
to vacate the injunction upon a showing of probable cause.
50
 
Given this option, should the current district attorney, Jeff Mit-
chell,
51
 decide to bring charges against Nancy Doe, he will likely util-
ize Pennsylvania’s child pornography statue and its severe attendant 
punishments.
52
  If the statute is applied literally, and the State can 
prove that Doe either possessed or distributed the photo, Mitchell’s 
prosecution may prove successful.  The State would have to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the girl’s nudity was “depicted for the 
purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who 
might view [the] depiction” of a child under age eighteen.
53
  Ulti-
mately, without any legislative guidance and despite the ruling in Mil-
ler, the prosecutor’s discretion could control, no matter how absurd 
the result. 
The Miller case is also notable for several reasons.  Significantly, 
the case illustrates the dangers of prosecutorial discretion.  In Miller, 
one of the charged plaintiffs was wrapped in a towel.
54
  Despite this 
fact, Skumanick reasoned that any girl dressed “provocatively” was 
subject to harsh criminal sanctions.
55
  Convinced that he could em-
ploy plainly inapplicable laws, Skumanick abused his prosecutorial 
discretion by seeking to make examples of the sexting participants.  
Skumanick threatened to charge the children under the state’s child 
pornography law, which prohibits one from “knowingly possess[ing]” 
a picture “depicting a child under the age of eighteen years engaging 
in a prohibited sexual act.” 
56
  The Act defines a “prohibited sexual 
act” to include “lewd exhibition of the genitals or nudity if such nudi-
ty is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of 
any person who might view such depiction.”
57
 
 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 155. 
 50 Miller, 598 F.3d at 154. 
 51 District Attorney Skumanick lost to Mitchell in a November 2009 election.  Id. 
at 145.   
 52 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312(d)(1) (2010). 
 53 § 6312(a). 
 54 Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 639 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub nom. 
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 55 See Searcey, supra note 43. 
 56 § 6312(d)(1). 
 57 § 6312(g). 
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As further evidence of such prosecutorial indiscretion, Skuma-
nick created his own rules, and in doing so, he afforded parents a ri-
gid take-it-or-leave-it offer.  When questioned about his mandate that 
children could only avoid criminal charges if they completed the 
counseling and education program, he flatly told the accused child-
ren’s parents that “these are the rules [and] [i]f you don’t like them, 
too bad.”
58
  Ultimately, and most importantly, the federal judge in 
Miller, in a ruling affirmed by the Third Circuit, did not “like” Sku-
manick’s “rules.”
59
  Although the Miller case has garnered significant 
mainstream media coverage,
60
 several other judicial responses to sext-
ing are noteworthy in that the courts have in large part been unsym-
pathetic to the sexting teens and accordingly allow prosecutorial dis-
cretion to control.
61
  In fact, the courts are content to affirm 
prosecutorial applications of child pornography statutes to sexting 
participants.  Despite the result in Miller,
62
 and as the subsequent cas-
es illustrate, little debate typically surrounds the application of child 
pornography laws in most sexting cases.
63
 
In A.H. v. State, a Florida appeals court upheld the conviction of 
two juveniles charged with violating a Florida child pornography 
law.
64
  The prosecutor filed charges after the juveniles, who were boy-
friend and girlfriend, took pictures of themselves naked and engaged 
in sexual behavior.
65
  As in a typical consensual sexting situation, the 
juveniles emailed the photos to each other, but the photos never cir-
culated to a third party.
66
  On appeal, the defendant, A.H., argued 
 
 58 Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 638. 
 59 Id.   
 60 See, e.g., Michael Rubinkam, Judge Blocks Charges in Teen ‘Sexting’ Case, MSNBC 
(Mar. 30, 2009, 8:20 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29964324/. 
 61 See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); State v. 
Canal, No. 07-1051, 2009 WL 3051556, at *1 (Iowa Sept. 18, 2009); State v. Vezzoni, 
No. 22361-2-III, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 864, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2005). 
 62 Notably, the district court in Miller, in issuing the temporary restraining order, 
highlighted that the prosecutor sought to pursue charges against two of the girls who 
were merely pictured “provocatively.”  See Searcey, supra note 41.  
 63 See Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor 
Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 513 (2008).  Smith noted that child pornography 
laws “clearly do not exempt cases where minors produce or disseminate pornograph-
ic images of themselves.  They plainly apply to any pornographic depictions of a mi-
nor.  It makes no difference, from a definitional standpoint, whether or not the child 
pornography was produced by the minor featured in the images.”  Id.    
 64 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
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that the Florida statute
67
 was unconstitutional as applied to her.
68
  
Specifically, A.H.’s primary contention was that the application of the 
statute violated her state constitutional right to privacy.
69
  The court 
disagreed and first stated that “[t]he State’s interest in protecting 
children from exploitation in this statute is the same regardless of 
whether the person inducing the child to appear in a sexual perfor-
mance and then promoting that performance is an adult or a mi-
nor.”
70
 The court added that A.H. had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy when she and her boyfriend took the pictures and subse-
quently emailed them to each other.
71
  Interestingly, the court—citing 
the Florida legislature’s desire to prevent further production of such 
images—was concerned that the consensual sexting would evolve into 
nonconsensual sexting.
72
  In fact, the likelihood that the exchanged 
photos might become public, ultimately compelled the court to rule 
in favor of the State.
73
 
More recently, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed another con-
sensual sexting prosecution and upheld the conviction of the defen-
dant in State v. Canal.
74
  Canal was eighteen when he sent a photo of 
his erect penis to his friend C.E., who at the time was fourteen.
75
  
Canal and C.E. admitted that Canal sent the picture as a joke and on-
 
 67 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.071(3) (West 2006).  
A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, 
knowing the character and content thereof, he or she produces, di-
rects, or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by 
a child less than 18 years of age.  Whoever violates this subsection is 
guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 
Id. 
 68 A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235.  
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 238. 
 71 Id. at 237. 
 72 Id. at 238.  
Appellant asserts that the State only has a compelling interest when the 
photograph or video is shown to a third party.  The Legislature has, 
however, recognized a compelling interest in seeing that the videotape 
or picture including “sexual conduct by a child of less than 18 years of 
age” is never produced. 
Id. 
 73 Id. (“The fact that these photographs may have or may not have been shown in 
no way affects the minor’s reasonable expectation that there was a distinct and real 
possibility that the other teenager involved would at some point make these photos 
public.”).  
 74 773 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009). 
 75 Id. 
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ly upon C.E.’s request.
76
  Despite this fact, after C.E.’s mother 
checked her daughter’s email, found the photograph, and subse-
quently turned it over to the police, Iowa authorities charged Canal 
under Iowa Code section 728.2
77
 for knowingly disseminating obscene 
material to a minor.
78
 
Canal urged the court to set aside the conviction and argued 
that insufficient evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that the 
photograph he sent to C.E. was obscene.
79
  He contended that the 
picture that he sent “only appealed to a natural interest in sex” and 
was thus not obscene.
80
  Notably, Canal, not seeking to challenge the 
statute as applied to him,
81
 made no argument that such application 
ran counter to the legislature’s intent when it passed the child por-
nography law or to the state’s overarching public policy considera-
tions.  As such, the court did not address these issues.  Ultimately, in 
affording considerable deference to the jury’s verdict, the court disa-
greed with Canal and upheld his conviction.
82
 
In 2005, state prosecutors in Washington successfully pursued a 
nonconsensual sexting conviction, which a state appellate court ulti-
mately upheld.  In State v. Vezzoni, the defendant, a sixteen-year-old, 
took pictures of his girlfriend, also sixteen, which depicted her un-
clothed breasts and genitals.
83
  Without her consent, the defendant 
 
 76 Id. 
 77 IOWA CODE § 728.2 (2010) (“Any person, other than the parent or guardian of 
the minor, who knowingly disseminates or exhibits obscene material to a minor, in-
cluding the exhibition of obscene material so that it can be observed by a minor on 
or off the premises where it is displayed, is guilty of a public offense and shall upon 
conviction be guilty of a serious misdemeanor.”). 
 78 Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528 at 529. 
 79 Id. at 530.  Obscenity is defined as 
any material depicting or describing the genitals, sex acts, masturba-
tion, excretory functions or sadomasochistic abuse which the average 
person, taking the material as a whole and applying contemporary 
community standards with respect to what is suitable material for mi-
nors, would find appeals to the prurient interest and is patently offen-
sive; and the material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, scientific, 
political, or artistic value. 
Id. at 530–31. 
 80 Id. at 532. 
 81 Presumably, this may have been because Canal was eighteen, an adult, at the 
time of his conviction.  See id. at 529. 
 82 Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528 at 532 (holding that “the jury could find, by applying its 
own contemporary community standards with respect to what is suitable material for 
minors, that the material appealed to the prurient interest, was patently offensive, 
and lacked serious literary, scientific, political, or artistic value”). 
 83 No. 22361-2-III, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 864, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 
2005). 
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later showed the pictures to his classmates after he and his girlfriend 
broke up.
84
  In appealing his conviction, the defendant argued that 
the statute was unconstitutional as applied to a minor in that it in-
fringed on his right to privacy.
85
  The court, though, did not find this 
argument persuasive.  Citing the state’s interest in protecting child-
ren from sexual exploitation as well as the legislature’s decision not to 
create age-based distinctions for potential offenders under the state’s 
child pornography statutes, the court affirmed the defendant’s con-
viction.
86
  As these cases illustrate, little judicial sympathy has arisen 
for teenage sexting offenders.  The courts mechanistically apply child 
pornography laws, and in doing so, they destroy child defendants’ 
lives.  The time is ripe for legislatures to act appropriately. 
2. Scholarly Responses 
Many question whether any criminal response, let alone the 
harsh consequences that stem from criminal liability under child 
pornography statutes,
87
 is appropriate for sexting offenses.  Broadly 
speaking, a proper societal response to sexting focuses on two com-
peting interests.  First, as evidenced by both state and federal legisla-
tive responses, society has taken a very forceful approach to combat 
child pornography.
88
 Child pornography offenders—no matter their 
ages—are punished under very stringent criminal penalties.
89
  Work-
ing counter to this first interest of eliminating child pornography and 
punishing offenders is society’s recognition that minors often engage 
in destructive behavior, such as sexting, but they are not mature 
enough to appreciate the social harm that is a product of such beha-
vior.
90
  Accordingly, these minors should not face criminal law pu-
nishment for sexting.  The harms that result from sexting include the 
possibility that the sexted content can ultimately end up in the pos-
 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id.  Vezzoni asserted that because case law provides that minors have a consti-
tutional right to engage in private sexual activity, the state was precluded from regu-
lating minors who take and possess pornographic photographs.  Id. at *3.  
 86 Id. at *4–6. 
 87 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (2006) (stating that a first-time offender found 
guilty of knowingly disseminating or distributing child pornography “shall be fined 
under this title and imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years”). 
 88 Discussion on the Protocols Needed in Online Child Self-Exploitation Cases, VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. (Feb. 5, 2008), mms://wms.edgecastcdn.net/000184/podcast/streaming/ 
news/0708/child_exploit.wma [hereinafter Child Self-Exploitation Cases Podcast].  
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
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session of a child pornographer.
91
  An additional concern is that ma-
terial that is initially consensually sexted may later be forwarded with-
out the photo subject’s consent.
92
  In a high school setting, for in-
stance, some students have used nonconsensual sexting as a form of 
revenge, a means to humiliate the photo subject.
93
 
To neutralize these competing interests, one researcher has 
proposed a relatively comprehensive prosecutorial protocol.  Al-
though she has not utilized the “sexting” moniker,
94
 Mary Graw Leary, 
a former deputy director for the Office of Legal Counsel at the Na-
tional Center for Missing and Exploited Children and the former di-
rector of the National Center for the Protection of Child Abuse, has 
explored the issue of child “self-exploitation” in great detail.
95
  Leary 
argues that prosecutors should assess a number of factors to deter-
mine whether juvenile prosecution is appropriate in a particular sext-
ing case.
96
  She divides the factors into two overarching categories: of-
fender specific and crime specific.
97
  For the offender-specific 
considerations, Leary argues that prosecutors should assess why the 
juvenile engaged in the activity, the frequency of the juvenile’s activi-
ty, and the juvenile’s age and support network.
98
  As for the second 
factor, the crime itself, Leary suggests that prosecutors consider “the 
circumstances around the exploitation, whether or not other youths 
are brought into the production, the role of this particular youth in 
the production, whether it was for commercial purposes, or profit 
motive, the extent of the distribution, the theme of the images, and 
the severity of the images.”
99
  By assessing these factors, the state can 
determine if prosecution is required or another approach is more 
appropriate.
100
 
 
 91 See O’Crowley, supra note 18.  The author quotes John Shehan, the director of 
Exploited Child Division of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 
who said, “These [child pornographers] collect these images like your average citizen 
collects baseball cards. . . .  The content can live out there forever.”  Id.   
 92 Id.  
 93 Id. (describing the story of an anonymous New Jersey high school teacher who 
said a student at her school was suspended for such “revenge” sexting). 
 94 Leary refers to the sexting content as “self-produced child pornography.”  Mary 
Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate Societal Response to Juvenile 
Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2007). 
 95 Id.  
 96 See Child Self-Exploitation Cases Podcast, supra note 88. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See Leary, supra note 95, at 50.  
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Leary’s perspective is notable in that she recognizes, albeit flee-
tingly, that sexting is manifested in many ways.  Still, Leary urges a 
prosecutorial protocol that would inevitably greatly enhance prosecu-
torial discretion.  Although Leary outlines a comprehensive ap-
proach, the ultimate authority in each sexting case would still lie ex-
clusively with the prosecutor, who would be tasked with balancing the 
factors and subsequently determining an appropriate course of ac-
tion.  Accordingly, the prosecutor would retain considerable discre-
tion, an approach of which this Comment is skeptical. 
In contrast to Leary’s juvenile prosecution option, another re-
searcher has countered that juvenile punishment under the “heavy 
hand” of the criminal law is not an appropriate response.
101
  Stephen 
Smith, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law, equates 
sexting prosecutions to the prosecution of suicide attempts.
102
  He ar-
gues that in both instances, the person is calling out for help, and as 
such, “[t]he proper response of a compassionate society is to help 
people in those situations, not to add legal troubles and incarceration 
to their list of woes.”
103
  Smith adds that society needs a realistic ap-
proach under which prosecutors must recognize a distinction be-
tween conventional child pornography and self-produced child por-
nography;
104
 the harsh punishments were created for the former.
105
  
As such, Smith argues that in sexting cases,
106
 prosecutorial imple-
mentation of harsh criminal laws is not wise and accordingly, Leary’s 
prosecutorial guidelines are unnecessary.
107
 
As Leary does, Smith asserts that prosecutorial discretion should 
ultimately control; unlike Leary, though, Smith proposes a different 
end result.
108
  Equipped with such discretion, Smith argues that pros-
ecutors should refrain from filing charges and should first utilize 
child protective services to rehabilitate children and educate them 
about the dangers of sexting.
109
  According to Smith, prosecutors 
 
 101 See Child Self-Exploitation Cases Podcast, supra note 88; see also Smith, supra 
note 63. 
 102 See Child Self-Exploitation Cases Podcast, supra note 88.  
 103 Id. 
 104 See Smith, supra note 63, at 516 (describing conventional child pornography as 
that involving the “rape and molestation of children, captured on film or in other 
visual formats”). 
 105 See id. 
 106 Smith does not use the term sexting and instead utilizes “self-produced child 
pornography,” a phrase that Leary employs.  Id. at 506; see Leary, supra note 95. 
 107 See Child Self-Exploitation Cases Podcast, supra note 88.  
 108 Smith, supra note 63, at 507. 
 109 Id. 
LATZER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  2:55 PM 
2011] COMMENT 1053 
should only apply criminal laws under very limited circumstances.
110
  
For one, he suggests that the criminal law should be used as a means 
to entice minors to cooperate with law enforcement officers who seek 
to eradicate pedophiles and sexual predators.
111
  And he says that 
prosecutors should also consider using the criminal law to convince 
uncooperative minors “who have made or distributed pornographic 
images of themselves in the past to cease and desist and help remedy 
the situation they created.”
112
 
Following a similar approach, other researchers have broadly 
criticized the criminalization of sexting.
113
  Several satellite offices of 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have also urged lawmak-
ers to eliminate criminal-law solutions to sexting.
114
  Still, while these 
researchers, including Smith and the ACLU, are adamant that the 
criminal law is not an appropriate remedy to combat sexting, they do 
not address instances of nonconsensual sexting. 
3. A Response to Nonconsensual Sexting 
With many researchers and lawmakers failing to delineate be-
tween consensual and nonconsensual sexting, most states have un-
surprisingly neither proposed nor passed laws addressing nonconsen-
sual sexting.
115
  Instead, they are seemingly content to equip 
prosecutors with the discretion to apply antiquated child pornogra-
phy laws.  Despite silence from lawmakers, a Florida nonconsensual 
 
 110 Id. at 541. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 541–42. 
 113 See, e.g., Child Self-Exploitation Cases Podcast, supra note 88.  Anne Coughlin, 
a professor from the University of Virginia School of Law, questioned whether sex-
ters are “troubled” children.  Id.  She said, 
Nobody fits into school when they’re 15 to 17.  Everybody these days 
turns to the internet and to Facebook, that’s where they live, that’s 
where they talk. . . .  The fact that a child is turning to the internet is 
not a sign that they’re a troubled child. . . .  [Sexting] is a serious social 
question.  
Id.  She added that society cannot trust quick criminal fixes by local prosecutors.  Id.; 
see also Vivian Berger, Stop Prosecuting Teens for ‘Sexting,’ 197 N.J. L.J. 409, 419 (2009) 
(arguing that sexting “is a social, not a criminal problem, to whose solution law en-
forcement has nothing positive to contribute”). 
 114 See O’Crowley, supra note 18.  “We think this is appropriately addressed within 
the family structure.”  Id. (quoting Edward Barocas, the legal director of the ACLU of 
New Jersey); see also Letter from Jeffrey M. Gamso, Legal Director, American Civil Li-
berties Union of Ohio, to members of the Ohio General Assembly (Apr. 2, 2009), 
available at http://www.acluohio.org/issues/JuvenileJustice/LetterToOGA_ 
Sexting2009_0402.pdf.   
 115 See infra Part III. 
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sexting case has garnered considerable mainstream media attention 
and evidences why a legislative response to nonconsensual sexting is 
necessary.
116  At the age of eighteen, Philip Alpert, was convicted of fe-
lony child pornography charges and was required to register as a sex 
offender after he forwarded pictures of his then sixteen-year-old 
girlfriend to her friends and family without her consent.
117
  Alpert de-
cided to forward the pictures after he and his girlfriend got into a 
fight.
118
 
Alpert’s case illustrates the steep criminal ramifications for non-
consensual sexting when prosecutors utilize child pornography laws.  
As a registered sex offender, Alpert is listed “next to people who have 
raped children” and “molested kids.”
119
  Alpert insists that his situa-
tion exemplifies the incompatibility of child pornography laws in the 
context of sexting.
120
 
Despite the consequences that have stemmed from Alpert’s 
prosecution, punishment proponents argue that this sort of unforgiv-
ing prosecutorial response is appropriate.  They cite a recent Ohio 
case in which a teen committed suicide after she and her boyfriend 
engaged in consensual sexting, and the boyfriend forwarded the 
girl’s pictures upon their breakup.
121
  Ridiculed by her high school 
classmates about the pictures, the girl, Jessica Logan, ultimately 
hanged and killed herself in her bedroom, when she was just eigh-
teen-years-old.
122
  As Logan’s situation demonstrates, when teens en-
gage in nonconsensual sexting, the ramifications can be life-changing 
not just for the offender but for the victim as well.
123
  Thus, punish-
 
 116 See, e.g., Deborah Feyerick & Sheila Steffen, ‘Sexting’ Lands Teen on Sex Offender 
List, CNN (Apr. 7, 2009, 10:50 AM), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-04-07/justice/ 
sexting.busts_1_phillip-alpert-offender-list-offender-registry?_s=PM:CRIME. 
 117 See id. (noting that Alpert pleaded no contest to the charges but was later con-
victed).  
 118 Id.; Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, When Sex and Cell Phones Collide: Inside 
the Prosecution of a Teen Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 16 (2009).  The 
author quotes Alpert as saying, “I wasn’t thinking at all.  Had I thought about it, I 
might have realized this is probably illegal, but I certainly wouldn’t have known all 
the ramifications of it.”  Id. 
 119 Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 116.  
 120 See id.  The article quotes Alpert as saying, “You think child pornography, you 
think six-year-old, three-year-old little kids who can’t think for themselves, who are 
taken advantage of.  That really wasn’t the case.”  Id. 
 121 Mike Celizic, Her Teen Committed Suicide Over ‘Sexting,’ MSNBC.COM (Mar. 6, 
2009, 9:26 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29546030.  
 122 Id. 
 123 See Andrea Slane, Sexting, Teens and a Proposed Offence of Invasion of Privacy, IP 
OSGOODE (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.iposgoode.ca/2009/03/sexting-teens-and-
a-proposed-offence-of-invasion-of-privacy.   
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ment proponents can argue that severe criminal ramifications are ne-
cessary to combat nonconsensual sexting. 
Advocates for harsh penalties can make two additional, related 
arguments.  For one, legislatures purposefully did not make age dis-
tinctions when they passed child pornography laws.
124
  Accordingly, 
because the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he prevention of 
sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government 
objective of surpassing importance,”
125
 a court or even a prosecutor 
refusing to apply a child pornography statute—even one with harsh 
attendant consequences—to a minor who engages in nonconsensual 
sexting would be inappropriate.
126
  Related to this assertion is the fact 
that, no matter the age of the perpetrator, the existence of child por-
nography is harmful to the children depicted, to other children ex-
posed to the child pornography, and to society as a whole.
127
  Pu-
nishment proponents can therefore argue that prosecutors should 
utilize child pornography statutes, even those with harsh attendant 
punishments, in an effort to deter any circulation of child pornogra-
phy.  Although this Comment recognizes the potential life-changing 
circumstances that can result from nonconsensual sexting, it none-
theless urges legislators to update or adopt laws to more sensibly ad-
dress and deter such sexting.
128
 
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO SEXTING 
In the midst of very well-publicized sexting prosecutions 
throughout the country, a number of state legislatures have ad-
 
 124 Id.  
 125 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982). 
 126 As the court stated: 
[T]he legislature is well aware of how to create different degrees of 
criminal liability on the basis of a specific age disparity between the of-
fender and the victim.”  When the legislature declines to make the dis-
tinctions based on age in the statute, “[t]here is no room for judicial 
interpretation . . . beyond the plain language of the statute.”  The legis-
lature did not intend to exclude juvenile offenders from the child por-
nography statutes. 
Vezzoni, No. 22361-2-III, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 864, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 
2005) (quoting State v. D.H., 9 P.3d 253, 256–57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)). 
 127 See Leary, supra note 94, at 9.  “Children’s exposure to [child] pornography 
can undermine their capabilities to avoid, resist, or escape sexual victimization, the-
reby making them more vulnerable to sexual victimization.”  Id. at 14 (quoting Diana 
E.H. Russell & Natalie J. Purcell, Exposure to Pornography as a Cause of Sexual Victimiza-
tion, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 59, 66 (Nancy E. Down, Do-
rothy G. Singer & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2006)). 
 128 See infra Part IV. 
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dressed or continue to address sexting.
129
  At minimum, these law-
makers are laudably attempting to distinguish child pornography laws 
from sexting laws.  Still, legislative action has thus far been primarily 
limited to consensual sexting situations.
130
  Not surprisingly, state res-
ponses typically occur after a local sexting prosecution prompts pub-
lic outcry. 
A. Proposals: New Jersey, New York, and Ohio 
When it comes to sexting, lawmakers in several states are only in 
the preliminary stages of modernizing their states’ criminal codes.  
Thus, even in the handful of states that have recognized sexting, 
there is not always legislative finality. 
New Jersey legislators were drawn to sexting after an incident in-
volving a Passaic County juvenile.
131
  The fourteen-year-old girl was ar-
rested and faced child pornography charges after she posted nearly 
thirty nude pictures of herself on MySpace.
132
  In response to this sto-
ry and out-of-state sexting prosecutions, a New Jersey lawmaker took a 
progressive approach to sexting.  In June 2009, Assemblywoman Pa-
mela Lampitt, a Democrat from Camden, New Jersey, sponsored 
three bills in which she sought to provide for “education and forgive-
ness before arrest and prosecution.”
133
  The bills, however, have sat 
idle since their introduction and still await a full assembly vote.
134
 
Lampitt’s primary bill creates a diversionary program for juve-
nile sexting offenders who could avoid criminal charges if they 
agreed to attend an educational program, which would highlight 
 
 129 See The Vexting Issue of ‘Sexting,’ NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/magazine/articles/2009/SL0709_Tren
ds.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) (stating that there are “hundreds of news stories” 
focused on sexting and that legislatures “in at least nine states have introduced legis-
lation this year aimed at deterring teens from sexting and preventing legal loopholes 
that would allow sexual predators to escape prosecution”).  
 130 As noted, consensual sexting situations are those in which two or perhaps 
more juveniles transmit photos of themselves and each juvenile participates knowing-
ly and willfully.  See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.  The concept extends 
to instances in which one of the teens posts the photos of himself or herself on the 
internet.  Id.   
 131 Girl in Nude Photos Case Will Undergo Counseling, HERALD NEWS (New Jersey), 
June 24, 2009, at B1. 
 132 Id.  The article notes that the prosecutor agreed to drop the charges when the 
girl stated she would undergo counseling during her six months of probation.  Id. 
 133 Elise Young, N.J. Assemblywoman Pamela Lampitt Pushes Bills to Deal with Teen 
‘Sexting,’ NJ.COM (July 20, 2009, 5:45 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/ 
07/trenton_nj_ap_like.html.  
 134 See id. 
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both the legal and non-legal consequences of sexting.
135
  Notably, the 
bill limits the program to juveniles who created, exhibited, and dis-
tributed sexually explicit photos “without malicious intent.”
136
  Appar-
ently, the bill would protect from criminal prosecution juveniles who 
send or create either provocative photos of themselves or others or 
photos of a sexually explicit nature.
137
  Moreover, by limiting the bill’s 
reach to teens who acted “without malicious intent,”
138
 the bill is un-
likely to protect teens from nonconsensual sexting prosecutions.  
Lampitt’s proposed bill additionally provides for significant prosecu-
torial discretion.
139
  It states that the “county prosecutor shall deter-
mine whether a juvenile shall be admitted to the program.”
140
 
In New York, the assembly has proposed a bill that, although less 
specifically tailored than New Jersey’s, attempts to achieve similar un-
derlying goals with a focus on education and criminal-punishment 
leniency for some teen sexters.
141
  First, the bill would require the 
state to create an educational outreach program that would highlight 
the dangers of sexting.
142
  Second, the bill would amend the penal law 
to “provide an affirmative defense to young persons for certain acts 
with regard to possession and dissemination of such images and pho-
tographs of themselves.”
143
  The defense would only apply where the 
defendant was at least four years younger than the “individual who 
received, sent or posted an image or photograph at issue in a crimi-
nal charge and where that individual expressly or implicitly ac-
quiesced in the defendant’s conduct.”
144
  As such, the bill would pre-
 
 135 See Assemb. B. 4069, 213th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Sess. (N.J. 2009). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. This point is notable because the prosecutor in Miller sought to charge even 
the teenagers who were pictured “provocatively.”  Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 
2d 364 (M.D. Pa. 2009).  See supra note 55 and accompanying text.   
 138 See Assemb. B. 4069. 
 139 Id.; see also supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.B.   
 140 Assemb. B. 4069 § (1)(b). 
 141 See Assemb. B. 8622, 232nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).  
 142 Id.  The lawmakers cited the potential long-term harm to juvenile privacy that 
may result from sexting.  
Specifically, the bill would direct: [T]he office of children and family 
services to establish an educational outreach program to promote the 
awareness of text messaging, emailing and internet posting among ado-
lescents, and create a campaign to address the potential long-term 
harm that may arise as a result of adolescents sending, receiving or 
posting on the internet images and photographs of themselves that in-
clude, but are not limited to, provocative or nude images.  
Id.  
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. (emphasis added). 
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sumably only provide a defense in consensual sexting situations, in-
cluding those where the photos in question included nudity and 
would thus ordinarily be criminalized under child pornography sta-
tutes.
145
  Importantly, though, the affirmative defense would not apply 
when individuals forward pictures of third-party teens even with their 
consent.
146
  Significantly, as in New Jersey, the bill awaits a vote from 
the full assembly.
147
 
In Ohio, lawmakers were drawn to sexting following a very well-
publicized and tragic sexting incident involving Jessica Logan, an 
eighteen-year-old who ultimately committed suicide.
148
  As in New Jer-
sey and New York, though, Ohio’s proposed law awaits further ac-
tion.
149
  As currently drafted, the Ohio bill would create a misdemea-
nor punishment for a minor who, “by use of a telecommunications 
device . . . recklessly create[s], receive[s], exchange[s], send[s], or 
possess[es] a photograph, video, or other ‘material’ that shows a mi-
nor in a state of ‘nudity.’”
150
  The proposed law explicitly provides no 
defense for the minor if he/she was pictured in the content.
151
  Under 
these guidelines, a consensual sexter clearly would face misdemeanor 
charges even when the content in question involved only pictures of 
himself or herself.
152
  Additionally, a sexter would apparently fall un-
der the bill’s ambit in an instance where the sexter forwarded pic-
tures of a third party with that third party’s consent.
153
  Further, law-
makers appear to intend to punish nonconsensual sexters under this 
bill as well.
154
  For example, if a minor intentionally or knowingly for-
warded nude pictures of his ex-girlfriend to her friends without her 
consent, he would be deemed to have “recklessly” sent such photo-
graphy and would thus fall under the proposed law.
155
 
 
 145 See id. 
 146 See id. 
 147 Assemb. B. 8622 (stating that the bill was referred to the assembly’s Ways and 
Means Committee on June 10, 2009). 
 148 See Russ, supra note 14. 
 149 H.B. 132, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. (“It is no defense to a charge under this section that the minor creates, 
receives, exchanges, sends, or possesses a photograph, video, or other material that 
shows [himself or herself] in a state of nudity.”). 
 152 See id. 
 153 See id. 
 154 See id. 
 155 This situation arose in State v. Vezzoni, No. 22361-2-III, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 
864, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2005).  See supra note 83–85 and accompanying 
text. 
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2. From Proposals to Laws: Vermont, Nebraska,  
and Illinois 
Some states have gone beyond mere proposals and turned ideas 
into laws.  In Vermont, lawmakers considered a similar approach to 
that proposed in New Jersey
156
 but ultimately took a different route.
157
  
Sparked by a mother’s testimony before the state’s judiciary panel in 
which the mother feared that her daughter could face child porno-
graphy charges after having unwillingly received a seminude video 
depiction of another minor,
158
 the legislature reduced, but did not 
eliminate, the penalties under the applicable child pornography 
laws.
159
  Specifically, the law provides that “[n]o minor shall . . . use a 
computer or electronic communication device to transmit an inde-
cent visual depiction of himself or herself to another person.”
160
  And 
under the law, a minor is prohibited from possessing any such visual 
depiction.
161
  Any minor found guilty under this provision will now 
face misdemeanor juvenile charges.
162
  As such, the law creates a re-
duced punishment
163
 in consensual sexting situations where a minor 
sends an “indecent” photo of “himself or herself.”
164
  Accordingly, the 
law clearly does not provide lesser penalties for nonconsensual sex-
ters.  Moreover, it presumably does not provide more lenient pu-
nishment in a consensual sexting situation in which a teen forwards a 
picture of a third party even with that third party’s consent.  Thus, it 
appears such an offender could be prosecuted under child porno-
graphy laws.  The meaning of “indecent” and whether it attaches to 
merely provocative photos under the law is also unclear.  As a tho-
rough review of the statute indicates, apparently but unsurprisingly, 
judicial clarification is needed. 
 
 156 See Vermont Considers Legalizing Teen ‘Sexting,’ FOX NEWS (Apr. 13, 2009),  
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,514875,00.html (detailing that lawmakers 
were considering decriminalizing consensual sexting between those thirteen to eigh-
teen years old but that “[p]assing along such images to others would remain a 
crime”).   
 157 See Kara Rowland, ‘Sexting’ Is Thorny Legal Issue, WASH. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at 
B1, available at 2009 WLNR 11991138. 
 158 See id. 
 159 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 2802b (2010). 
 160 § 2802b(a)(1). 
 161 Id.  The law absolves a teen from prosecution if he/she “took reasonable steps, 
whether successful or not, to destroy or eliminate the visual depiction.”  Id. 
 162 Id.  
 163 Previously, sexting offenders falling under the provision of this law were 
charged as felons and forced to register as sex offenders.  See Rowland, supra note 
157. 
 164 See § 2802b. 
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In Nebraska, the legislature also recently updated the state’s 
child pornography statute to address sexting.
165
  Concerned with cri-
minalizing the immature behavior of children, the state enacted two 
affirmative defenses to felony child pornography charges.
166
  The first 
affirmative defense is applicable to a teen under eighteen years of age 
who “create[s] . . . or in any manner generate[s]” a sexually explicit 
picture of himself or herself.
167
  The second affirmative defense pro-
vides, in part, that a teenager eighteen-years-old or younger who 
sends a sexually explicit image of himself or herself to a willing reci-
pient who is at least fifteen-years-old can avoid felony charges.
168
 
Importantly, under these guidelines, even assuming that the af-
firmative defenses do not apply, a prosecutor could not seek to pu-
nish children who sext mere provocative photos.
169
  This is notable 
because the prosecutor in Miller, utilizing his vast discretionary pow-
ers, sought to charge the teenagers for posing in a provocative na-
ture.
170
  Still, the Nebraska affirmative defenses are apparently some-
what limited, as neither defense protects teens who possess 
nonconsensually sexted photos.
171
  Thus, although lawmakers should 
be lauded for addressing sexting, Nebraska’s law is incomplete at 
best, and as such, it tasks law enforcement officials with the discretion 
to apply antiquated laws in many future sexting circumstances. 
In Utah, legislators focused on the distribution element of sext-
ing.  Under Utah law, juveniles who are prosecuted under the state’s 
child pornography-distribution statute
172
 or the “[d]ealing in material 
 
 165 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1463.03 (2010). 
 166 See Ben Schwartz, Technology Moves Faster than the Law, N. PLATTE BULL. (July 26, 
2009), http://www.northplattebulletin.com/index.asp?show=news&action=readStory 
&storyID=16958&pageID=3&sectionID=3.  The article quotes the state’s attorney 
general, Jon Bruning, “We don’t want to treat childish behavior as criminal activity.”  
Id. 
 167 § 28-1463.03(1),(6). 
 168 Id. § 28-1463.03(6).  In addition, the defense is only applicable where “the vis-
ual depiction . . . includes no person other than the defendant” and where “the de-
fendant had a reasonable belief at the time the visual depiction was sent to another 
that it was being sent to a willing recipient.”  § 28-1463.03(6)(b),(c).   
 169 See id. § 28-1463.03. Sexting becomes criminal only when the visual depiction is 
one of “sexually explicit conduct . . . which has a child as one of its participants or 
portrayed observers.”  Id.  Sexually explicit conduct is defined in part as “real or si-
mulated intercourse” and “erotic nudity.”  Id. § 28-1463.02(5). 
 170 See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub 
nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 171 § 28-1463.03. 
 172 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1204 (Lexis Nexis 2010). 
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harmful to a minor” statute
173 can now only be charged with a misde-
meanor as opposed to a felony.
174  Specifically, the statute states that 
juveniles who are sixteen or seventeen years old can be charged with 
a class A misdemeanor,
175 which is punishable by up to one year in jail 
and a fine of no more than $2,500.
176
  Juveniles younger than age six-
teen can only be charged with a class B misdemeanor, 
177
 which is pu-
nishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of no more than 
$1,000.
178
  In passing the bill, Utah legislators recognized the inherent 
sexting problem around the country and the controversy surround-
ing harsh juvenile punishments.
179
  Moreover, whether intentional or 
otherwise, the Utah bill seems to provide leniency in both consensual 
and nonconsensual sexting situations
180
 but only as far as the sender is 
 
 173 Id. § 76-10-1206. 
 174 H.B. 14, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2009). 
 175 Id.  
 176 UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N, PENALTY DISTRIBUTION FOR SELECTED CRIMES 1 
(2008), available at http://www.sentencing.utah.gov/Penalty%20Distribution/ 
PenaltyDistributionBooklet.pdf [hereinafter UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N]. 
 177 H.B. 14, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2009).   
 178 UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 176. 
 179 “[Juveniles] are less likely to recognize inherent risks and consider long-term 
consequences of their choices.” H.B. 14, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Jan. 27, 2009) (state-
ment of Rep. Sheryl Allen), available at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp? 
Sess=2009GS&Day=2&House=H.  “If we can get these young people into court, they 
can be counseled and assisted.”  Id. 
 180 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1206 (Lexis Nexis 2010).  In regard to dealing in ma-
terial harmful to a minor: 
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, 
knowing or believing that a person is a minor, or having negligently 
failed to determine the proper age of a minor, the person intentional-
ly: 
(a) distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to exhi-
bit, to a minor or a person the actor believes to be a minor, any 
material harmful to minors; 
(b) produces, performs, or directs any performance, before a 
minor or a person the actor believes to be a minor, that is harm-
ful to minors; or 
(c) participates in any performance, before a minor or a person 
the actor believes to be a minor, that is harmful to minors.   
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1204 (Lexis Nexis 2010) provides that in regard to distribut-
ing pornographic material: 
(1) A person is guilty of distributing pornographic material when the 
person knowingly: 
     . . . (c) distributes or offers to distribute, or exhibits or offers to ex-
hibit, any pornographic material to others. 
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concerned.
181
  Thus, a teen in receipt of sexted content could pre-
sumably still face felony charges even if the pictures were consensual-
ly sent.  In contrast, a teen who nonconsensually sexted pictures 
would only face misdemeanor charges under the updated provision. 
Illinois lawmakers have also focused on the distribution aspect of 
sexting.  Under its recently updated law, Illinois provides that a mi-
nor who “distribute[s] or disseminate[s] an indecent visual depiction 
of another minor” using a cell phone or a computer “may be[] or-
dered to obtain counseling” or “perform community service.”
182
  As 
with Utah’s sexting legislation, the Illinois law affords lesser punish-
ment in both consensual and nonconsensual sexting situations but 
only for the sender.
183
  Therefore, as in Utah, a teen in possession of 
sexted material could conceivably still face felony charges even if the 
pictures were consensually sexted.
184
  Nevertheless, a teen who sexted 
pictures, even nonconsensually, would apparently face considerably 
lesser charges under the state’s updated law. 
In contrast to the abovementioned legislatures, most state law-
makers remain silent about sexting.
185
  Silence even emanates from 
states that have prosecuted sexting offenders, including the Iowa and 
Florida where teens were prosecuted in A.H. and Canal, respective-
ly.
186
  Even in states that have addressed the issue, many bills remain 
pending, and, as the above examples illustrate,
187
 current laws often 
do not account for the many aspects of sexting, including both the 
possession and distribution elements.  The importance of finding an 
appropriate and all-encompassing solution to sexting cannot be un-
derstated, as “[t]he sexual development of both youth (victims and 
 
 181 Notably, the lawmakers did not lessen the penalties under UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-5a-3, which provides in part, “[A] person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor 
. . . when the person knowingly . . . possesses . . . child pornography.”  Id. § 76-5a-3. 
 182 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/3-40(b)–(d)(2) (2010). 
 183 See id. 
 184 Illinois’ child pornography statute punishes anyone who, “with the knowledge 
of the nature or content thereof, . . . possesses with intent to disseminate” an image 
of a child “depicted or portrayed in any pose, posture or setting involving a lewd ex-
hibition of the unclothed or transparently clothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, 
if such person is female, a fully or partially developed breast of the child or other 
person.”  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1(2), (1)(vii) (2010). 
 185 Notably, however, as of this Comment’s publication date, additional states were 
continuing to address sexting.  See 2010 Legislation Related to ‘Sexting,’ NAT’L CONF. OF 
STATE LEGS., http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19696 (last updated Jan. 4, 
2011). 
 186 See State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009); A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 
234, 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).  
 187 See supra notes 180–83. 
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offenders) is underway and if these incidents are not handled appro-
priately both . . . may be harmed[] developmentally.”
188
  Moreover, 
this Comment strongly urges that without a proper legislative re-
sponse, prosecutorial discretion will govern, perpetuating unpredict-
able and at times undesirable results.
189
 
IV. THE PROPER LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO SEXTING 
The term “sexting” is importantly an all-encompassing word.
190
  
Without a thorough consideration of the numerous circumstances in 
which sexting cases arise, however, society cannot properly respond.  
As the examples above illustrate, lawmakers have struggled to develop 
one all-encompassing response to sexting.
191
  Still, with sexting ma-
nifestations widespread, legislators must draw lines and prepare ap-
propriate anticipatory laws under the following guidelines. 
A. Clarify the Legislative Intent 
Lawmakers must clarify the legislative intent behind child por-
nography statutes by updating laws or creating new ones that are ap-
plicable in both consensual and nonconsensual sexting circums-
tances.  Legislators probably did not anticipate that prosecutors 
would utilize child pornography laws against the very same people 
whom the laws were designed to protect.
192
  In passing child porno-
graphy laws, lawmakers clearly aimed to eradicate any and all child 
pornography.  But laws must keep pace with technology.  Consensual 
sexting offenders should not face punishment under child pornogra-
phy statutes merely because the exchanged pictures may circulate 
 
 188 See Leary, supra note 94, at 26 (citing Roberta Lynn Sinclair & David Sugar, 
The Nat’l Child Exploitation Coordination Ctr. (NCECC) Strategic Operations Sup-
port Servs., Internet Based Sexual Exploitation of Children and Youth: Environmental Scan 
7, 25 (2005)) (internal quotations omitted).  
 189 See, e.g., Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub 
nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010); see also infra Part IV. 
 190 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 191 See supra Part III. 
 192 Kim Zetter, Child Porn Laws Used Against Kids Who Photograph Themselves, 
WIRED.com (Jan. 15, 2009, 9:50 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/ 
2009/01/kids/.  Mark Rasch, a former federal cybercrime prosecutor, said, “The 
problem is that the child porn laws were really designed for a situation where an 
adult abuses a minor by forcing that minor . . . psychologically as well as physically . . 
. into taking these pictures.”  Id.  When these laws are applied to sexting, Rasch ar-
gues, this “turns the whole statute on its head.”  Id.; see Smith, supra note 63 and ac-
companying text; see also Berger, supra note 113 (asserting that child pornography 
laws were passed to bring to justice “the grown-up perverts”).     
LATZER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  2:55 PM 
1064 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1039 
publicly.
193
  Moreover, prosecutorial application of child pornography 
laws to nonconsensual sexters is also inappropriate because the harsh 
punishments are disproportional to the sexting conduct. 
As an impetus to update laws to ensure that they are consistent 
with the legislative intent behind child pornography laws, at least in 
the context of consensual sexting, legislators should consider a recent 
Utah Supreme Court case.  In State ex. rel. Z.C., prosecutors charged a 
child under the state’s sexual abuse statute after the child engaged in 
consensual sex with another minor.
194
  Ruling for the defendant-
minor, the court held that to treat the defendant “as both a victim 
and a perpetrator of child sex abuse for the same act leads to an ab-
surd result that was not intended by the legislature.”
195
  The court fur-
ther stated that, at least in the context of sexual-assault crimes, no 
other prosecution could produce such an undesirable result.
196
 
Applied to the consensual-sexting context, this ruling is instruc-
tive.
197
  In many sexting prosecutions, the “State treats both children 
as perpetrators of the same act.”
198
  As such, the state is not protecting 
any “discernable victim.”
199
  And as with the sexual assault case in Z.C., 
a consensual-sexting prosecution produces an undesirable result con-
trary to the legislative intent behind the child pornography laws. 
As a separate parallel to sexting and the need for legislators to 
update or clarify the legislative intent behind child pornography laws, 
legislators should also consider the prosecutorial decision to punish 
 
 193 Such prosecution may even constitute criminalization of conduct that is pro-
tected by a constitutional right to privacy.  See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 241 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (Padovano, J., dissenting).  In criticizing the majority ruling, in 
which the court upheld two consensual-sexting convictions under the state’s child 
pornography laws, the dissent argued that “[t]he statute at issue was designed to pro-
tect children, but in this case the court has allowed the state to use it against a child 
in a way that criminalizes conduct that is protected by constitutional right of privacy.”  
Id.   
 194 State ex rel. Z.C.,165 P.3d 1206, 1206 (Utah 2007). In part, the statute holds 
that “[a] person commits sexual abuse of a child” if the person “touches the anus, 
buttocks, or genitalia of any child, the breast of a female child, or otherwise takes in-
decent liberties with a child.”  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 195 Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1206. 
 196 Id. at 1212 (“We know of no other instance in which the State has attempted to 
apply any sexual assault crime to produce such an effect.”).  
 197 See Jesse Michael Nix, Note, Unwholesome Activities in a Wholesome Place: Utah 
Teens Creating Pornography and the Establishment of Prosecutorial Guidelines, 11 J.L. & FAM. 
STUD. 183, 187 (2008) (arguing that “[s]ince the [Z.C.] court ruled that sexual as-
sault crimes presuppose a perpetrator and a victim, the court likely would view tee-
nagers trading nude photos of themselves to each other in the same way”). 
 198 Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1212.  
 199 Id. 
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statutory rape.
200
  The 1996 California case In re Meagan R.
201
 proves 
instructive in this context.  There, the court held that the defendant, 
a fourteen-year-old girl who had sex with a twenty-two-year-old man, 
could not be punished under the state’s statutory rape law,
202
 which 
provides that “[u]nlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual inter-
course accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the per-
petrator, if the person is a minor.”
203
  Because the defendant was the 
victim, the court held that the legislative intent behind the law was 
such that she could not be charged with conspiracy, aiding and abet-
ting, or as an accomplice to her own statutory rape.
204
  Applying this 
reasoning to sexting, a consensual sexter should not fall victim to 
child pornography statutes.
205
 
These prosecutorial parallels and judicial analyses provide con-
crete reasons why child pornography statutes are inapplicable in con-
sensual-sexting prosecutions.  Further legislative clarification of child 
pornography laws is also necessary for nonconsensual-sexting prose-
cutions.  By clarifying that the laws that were designed to eliminate 
child pornography to protect children and not punish them, legislators 
should concede that they in no way anticipated the application of 
such laws to nonconsensual sexting situations involving teenagers.  
Even assuming that legislators are intent on eliminating any and all 
child pornography—surely a desirable and necessary goal—and not 
just the conventional variety,
206
 they cannot accomplish this task at the 
risk of severely criminalizing teenage indiscretion. 
B. Limit Prosecutorial Discretion 
Without proper legislative action, prosecutors will continue to 
wield considerable discretion in determining how to combat sexting.  
When discretion in sexting cases rests solely with a prosecutor, he or 
she typically acts in a manner designed to send a message to the sext-
 
 200 See Clerk: Child Self-Pornography, DE NOVO (Apr. 12, 2004, 10:59 AM), 
http://www.blogdenovo.org/archives/169.html. 
 201 In re Meagan R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
 202 Id. 
 203 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (Deering 2010). 
 204 Meagan R., 49 Cal. Rptr. at 328.  
 205 See Eugene Volokh, Child Prosecuted for Child Pornography—of Herself, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Mar, 31, 2004, 9:38 AM), http://volokh.com/ 
2004_03_28_volokh_archive.html (“[I]t hardly seems to be much of a service to [the 
alleged sexting offender]—who is after all the supposed victim as well as the perpe-
trator—or to the fight against child porn more broadly.”).   
 206 See Smith, supra note 63 (arguing that the child pornography laws were de-
signed to combat “conventional” child pornography).  
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ing offenders.
207
  Sometimes the message is harsh.
208
  Other times, the 
prosecutorial message is more reasonable.
209
  No matter the severity of 
the ultimate message sent, many prosecutors are clearly intent on li-
miting sexting.
210
 
Even legislatures have recognized that prosecutorial discretion 
sometimes leads to questionable results in sexting cases.  In Nebraska, 
during legislative debates regarding the state’s sexting bill,
211
 an assis-
tant attorney general promised that he would never misuse his discre-
tion.
212
  He moreover expressed confidence that his prosecutorial col-
leagues would utilize the same caution before charging juveniles 
under child pornography statutes.
213
  Still, a Nebraska senator, recog-
nizing the high number of sexting prosecutions across the country, 
cautioned that legislative action is clearly necessary to limit prosecu-
torial discretion.
214
 
Indeed, as the Nebraska senator recognized, not all prosecutors 
appropriately exercise their discretion in sexting cases.  The actions 
of the district attorney in Miller, who asserted that he could utilize the 
state’s child pornography laws to punish children pictured in mere 
provocative photos, properly illustrate this assertion, and thus, the 
 
 207 See, e.g., Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d 
sub nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 208 See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Canal, 
773 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009).  
 209 In Newark, Ohio, for instance, a fifteen-year-old girl was arrested and charged 
under the state’s child pornography statutes after she sent racy photos of herself to 
classmates.  Martha Irvine, Porn Charges for ‘Sexting’ Stir Debate, MSNBC (Feb. 4, 2009, 
4:00 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29017808/.  Prosecutors ultimately 
agreed to drop the charges, provided that the girl abides by a curfew, has no cell 
phone use, and has no unsupervised internet access over the next few months.  Id. 
 210 “Hopefully we’ll get the message out to these kids,” said Michael McAlexander, 
a prosecutor in Allen County, Indiana, where a teenage boy is facing obscenity 
charges for allegedly sending pictures of his genitals to classmates.  James Merri-
weather & Ira Porter, TeXt-Rated Teens, NEWS. J. (Wilmington, Del.), Feb. 6, 2009, at 
A1, available at 2009 WLNR 18256595.  “We don’t want to throw these kids in jail.  
But we want them to think.”  Id.  
 211 See supra Part III. 
 212 Hearing on L.B. 97 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Leg., 1st Sess. 6 
(Neb. 2009) (statement of Corey O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General) (“I personally 
would never charge someone where they were going to face [felony] penalties for 
[sexting], because that, again, is not a pedophile”).   
 213 Id.  O’Brien added, “I guess I have a lot of confidence in my brethren in the 
prosecution field that they would feel the same way I do . . . .”  Id. 
 214 Id.  Senator Brenda Council said, “[P]erhaps it’s something that needs to be 
addressed [by this legislature], and I appreciate the confidence you express in the 
county attorneys in the state of Nebraska, but . . . clearly, that’s not the wave across 
the nation.”  Id. 
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case evidences the need for legislators to corral prosecutorial discre-
tion in sexting cases.
215
 
The Miller case stands as one of several examples of prosecutorial 
indiscretion.
216
 Indeed, a new sexting story seemingly develops each 
day.
217
  Without guidance from legislators, prosecutorial responses will 
remain at best inconsistent and at worst unforgiving and unreasona-
ble. 
C. Address the Two Broad Categories of Sexting: Consensual and 
Nonconsensual 
1. Consensual Sexting 
Lawmakers must entirely decriminalize consensual sexting of 
mere provocative pictures.  When photos do not rise to the level of 
child pornography, but sexting offenders are nonetheless prosecuted 
under child pornography statutes, questions arise about whether such 
prosecution infringes on the offender’s rights to free speech and pri-
vacy.  While a specific discussion of such implications is beyond the 
scope of this Comment, the Miller case makes clear that courts may 
not sit idly when the government potentially infringes the constitu-
tionally protected rights to free speech and privacy.
218
  Regardless of 
the potential free speech and privacy implications, consensual sexting 
of merely provocative pictures is an issue reserved for parents and 
schools to discuss with children—including the associated conse-
quences.  With respect to consensual sexting of merely provocative 
photos, though, such consequences should not include criminal sanc-
tions. 
States should also lighten penalties for consensual sexting of 
sexually explicit material.  Lawmakers must create a statutory frame-
work in which consensual sexting offenders are punished in the juve-
nile justice system and offered counseling for their indiscretions.  
Perhaps most importantly, parental intervention is vital.  Parents must 
communicate with their children “about issues of sexuality, privacy 
and appropriate boundaries long before they come across seminude 
 
 215 See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub nom. 
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010); see supra Part II. 
 216 See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 217 See, e.g., Michelle Esteban et al., 3 Teens Arrested in Sexting Case, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 28, 2010, 10:14 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/ 
414792_sexting28.html. 
 218 See Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 643–47. 
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pictures on their kids’ social networking pages.”
219
  Under this ap-
proach, teenage indiscretion will not create any significant criminal 
implications.  And proper guidance will hopefully deter teens from 
engaging in future sexting entirely. 
2. Nonconsensual Sexting 
Legislatures thus far either do not truly grasp, or alternatively 
choose to ignore, the broad category of nonconsensual sexting.  The 
time is ripe, however, for legislators to confront it.  States should util-
ize misdemeanor charges to punish those who forward sexted pic-
tures with the intent to cause emotional harm or distress to the pic-
tured juvenile.  Punishment should be reserved for the senders, not 
the juvenile recipient of the photos unless such recipient coerced the 
sender into forwarding the photos or later forwarded the photos 
himself to a third party. 
D. Eliminate Sex-Offender Registries 
Lawmakers must eliminate sex-offender registration require-
ments for teens in all sexting circumstances.
220
  Legislators can easily 
accomplish this task by punishing nonconsensual sexting offenders 
with misdemeanor charges.  As the Alpert story best illustrates,
221
 ju-
venile sex-offender registration can trigger harsh consequences.  As a 
registered sex offender, Alpert was forced to leave his community col-
lege before graduating and is now unable to find a job.
222
  In addition, 
he cannot live with his own father, whose house is situated too close 
to a high school—an area where sex offenders are prohibited.
223
 
 
 219 O’Crowley, supra note 18 (quoting John Shehan, director of the Exploited 
Child Division of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children) (empha-
sis added). 
 220 Because some young adults, such as Phillip Alpert, have fallen victim to sex-
offender registration for sexting offenses, this Comment further notes that legisla-
tures should consider protecting young adults from such sex-offender registration 
provided that they have had a relationship with the sexting subject and are of a simi-
lar age.  See Email from Lawrence G. Walters, Attorney at Law, Walters Law Group, to 
author (Jan. 8, 2010) (on file with author) (suggesting such a solution for young 
adults). 
 221 See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.  Alpert was eighteen when he 
was convicted under the state’s child pornography statute and forced to register as a 
sex offender.  Id.  As such, he was considered an adult under the applicable criminal 
statutes.  Id.  Still, Alpert’s story is illustrative because the same consequences stem-
ming from sex-offender registration would apply to a juvenile, as well.  Id. 
 222 See Richards & Calvert, supra note 118, at 9. 
 223 Id. at 21. 
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More generally, researchers have found juvenile sex-offender 
registration problematic in that it does not consider juvenile cogni-
tive ability, mental illness, or child development.
224
  These three fac-
tors nonetheless play a crucial role in juvenile offending.
225
 
Most juvenile sex offenders do not understand their behavior, 
and they must overcome that denial and work through that fear 
to create behavioral changes.  One of the largest fears is that the 
reaction of the community and sex offender registration validates 
that fear, allowing the juvenile to believe there is no possibility of 
change.
226
 
Without prompt, one state supreme court recently made refer-
ence to sex-offender registration for juvenile sexting offenders.
227
  It 
too recognized, although impliedly, that such sex-offender registra-
tion should be eliminated.
228
  In oral arguments before the Utah Su-
preme Court in a case regarding the state’s sex-offender registry, the 
Chief Justice implied that such a penalty was too harsh for sexting of-
fenders.
229
  In response to the Chief Justice’s question, the attorney 
representing the state replied that “[t]aking dirty [photos] with a cell 
phone hardly seems like an offense deserving such a punishment.”
230
 
Legislators should follow the Chief Justice’s lead and recognize 
that any sexting punishment must be proportional to the act.  When 
sex-offender registration consequences stem from sexting, the pu-
nishment far outweighs the act.  This is true even in nonconsensual 
sexting circumstances, such as Philip Alpert’s, where youthful indi-
scretion should not trigger a punishment that forever alters the of-
fender’s life. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As technology evolves, lawmakers have a duty to make certain 
that criminal laws keep pace.  Without proper legislative attention, 
 
 224 See Leary, supra note 95, at 46 (citing Robert E. Longo & Martin C. Calder, The 
Use of Sex Offender Registration with Young People Who Sexually Abuse, in CHILDREN AND 
YOUNG PEOPLE WHO SEXUALLY ABUSE 334 (Martin C. Calder ed., 2005)). 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 See Nix, supra note 197, at 187 (citing Audio recording: Utah Supreme Court 
Oral Arguments before Utah Supreme Court in State v. Briggs, No. 20070186 (Utah 
Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/sup/streams/index.cgi?mon=20084 
(click “Listen” next to “State v. Briggs 20060671”)). 
 228 See id.   
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. (citing Geoffrey Fattah, Parents Fear Kids Will Be on Sex List, DESERET 
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 5, 2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 6417638). 
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prosecutors are compelled to apply antiquated statutes to unintended 
circumstances, commonly resulting in undesirable consequences.  
The context of teenage sexting perfectly illustrates this principle; in 
recent years, prosecutors have employed child pornography statutes 
with harsh attendant circumstances to target immature teens making 
questionable decisions. 
Now, more than ever, with statistics indicating that sexting is 
prevalent among teens, legislatures must take action.  Even recogniz-
ing that one cannot predict all potential sexting circumstances, and 
as such, it would be largely impossible for lawmakers to create one all-
encompassing law, legislative inaction is inexcusable.  To start, law-
makers should reference legislative solutions from other states, in-
cluding Utah and Illinois, and even mere proposals, such as those 
discussed in New Jersey. 
Although largely flawed, the statutes provide lawmakers with ne-
cessary background guidance to address an issue of utmost public 
importance.  Notably, proper legislative action would help curtail fu-
ture unsympathetic judicial rulings.
231
  Moreover, and perhaps most 
importantly, lawmakers must act to prevent further prosecutorial in-
discretions, which were apparent in Miller v. Skumanick.
232
  By estab-
lishing guidelines that directly address both consensual and noncon-
sensual sexting, lawmakers can assure that teenage indiscretion does 
not in turn result in prosecutorial indiscretion.  With an understanding 
that harsh criminal consequences, including sex-offender registra-
tion, are inappropriate for teens even in the context of nonconsen-
sual sexting, lawmakers can properly uphold public policy goals relat-
ing to both the elimination of child pornography and proportional 
punishments for teens.  If legislatures fail to act properly, or worse, sit 
idly, prosecutors will continue to act blindly and inconsistently, and 
America’s teens will suffer the consequences. 
 
 231 See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 232 See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub 
nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
